Benefits of Intentional Objects Arkadiusz “Arek” Chrudzimski (Uni of Szczecin)

Intentional state basic description: Subject => intentional state => object

Existential generalization (and substitutivity ?) fails in intentional contexts I.e. “John is thinking of Tristan”, “Tristan is the lover of Isolde” != “John is thinking of the lover of Isolde”

We can postulate mediating entities (e.g., Frege's “sense”)

There is an x such that John is grasping x and if Tristan exists, then x represents Tristan

INTab IMM (immanence): relation between the conscious subject and the mediating entity REPR rel. of representation that obtains between the mediating entity and the object

Frege's doesn't enter an answer on REPR, so Int. Obj's offers an ont. model

An identifying property phi is had by both the intentional obj and the reference object

But then properties of nonexistent obj. seem to exist! Answers: Meinongian way: int. golden mountain really ’is’ a golden mtn but doesn’t exist in the full sense of the word Brentano’s way: g mtn really exists, but has the property only in a modified sense of the copula

Possible answer to B: mediating entities only represent the identifying properties. (Regress?) -Arek’s objection is that this removes the benefit: a phi-object which “just has” the relevant identifying properties.

Answer to former objection: we have a dilemma, and introspection doesn’t reveal either representations in themselves or their correlations, but only the identifying properties. Thus we ought accept int. objects exist.

Platonic view by contrast: grasping properties directly (including non-exemplified properties of non-existent objects)

... Q: Why do we accept that “is representing x” is a property, and not that properties are representational?

upshot: -Allows us to recover Aristotelian intuition that there are no “free-floating” properties - problem of qualia - still external, but exist in intentional objects (int.obj.’s are produced by minds, but not “in” them) -ontological negativity: holes & other negations exist? We don’t need truth-makers for neg. sentences, but this doesn’t map to contents... Having negative thoughts would entail an infinite set of disjunctive states for each intentional state with neg content. Here, int.obj's allow us to have a neg. encoding-nexus alongside positive ones.

Q&A Demonstrative reference- ?