Brentano's Concept of Mind Uriah Kriegel (Uni of Arizona, now in France)

Thesis: For B, the concept of mind is a natural kind

Quoted B “int is the mark of the mental” - but this is only one account of six! (Photo)

So why isn't inner perception primary? -traces intentionality’s primacy back to phrase

“The feature which best characterizes the mental is ’intentional in-existence’.

So what does he mean by this? -that mind is a natural kind, Where the referent"s underlying nature is intentionality And the emergence-fixer has to do with inner perception

Natural joints are things that must be studied a posteriori (meanings of words, scientific classifications)

-this the concept of mind picks out a set of properties that mark the boundaries of what a mind is

Defective/problematic for Brentano (from photo-picking out importance of intentionality by knocking out other points): 1 (disjunctive), 2 (negative characterization)

4,5,6 don't seem problematic, but don't get as much at the essence of mentality- can't answer ’how to classify’ mental phenomena.

Fundamental classes of B's (Kriegel): Judgment; Interest (phenomena of love and hate-what should be the case); Presentation (neutrally directed)

Judgment (mind-world direction of fit) Interest (world-mind direction of fit) Presentation (no direction / neutral)

If you want to do this, must avoid using the functional characterization of DoF in context of B (Arek later pointed out that the interest-fit may not work -yet another reason to avoid that characterization, and divide these only intentionally)

Instead, consider lack of conativity in wishes (Aristotle) (?) ah- disagreement possibly on intention here

Intentionality provides the method to demarcate mental from physical.

Objection: Int is too narrow to serve as underlying nature of the mental (leaves out moods, and ’algedonic sensations’)

Response 1- pleasantness as represented 2ndary quality Response 2- on moods (some - Crane, Siegel(?) - depict moods as directed towards the world en masse) Response 3- non-derivative intentionality as underlying nature of the mental

B 1911- intentionality only “relational-ish” (why they can be instantiated even when their relata don't exist) - unintelligible? (Kriegel)

Splitting the claim 4 (photo) 4a. Only mental phenomena are inner-perceived -how not to be trivial? Inner perception defined as “perception with evidence” -only mental phenomena are perceived with Evidenz

4b. All mental phenomena are inner-perceived falls out of two claims: -consciousness implicates inner perception -all mental states are conscious ones

Three counter examples to the second claim behind 4b- Sub-personal states posited in cognitive science Dispositional states posited in folk psychology Repressed states posited in “deep psychology”

Answer- these processes are neurophysiological, but not ’mental’. Unconscious states are only ’peripheral’

Obj: not plausible! (Photo)

Reply: Similarity condition on unconscious mentality. - to call things mental which deviate from conscious states in the most essential respect goes against the meaning of the word (PES p.107)

B is -open- to the possibility of unconscious mental states, but they would have to resemble prototypical mental states in essential respects- but conscious states are the prototypes of mentality, so they don’t (can't?) resemble mental states

So acquiring the concept of mind -the meaning of ”mental”- requires the conscious experiences which are the inner perception of our acquaintance. ..and the underlying nature of this experience is intentionality.