“Cognitive Penetration and Nonconceptual Content”
Perceptual experiences as having non-c content -for x to represent the world is to say x has content
We think exp have one or more of the following props -fineness of grain -unit-free representation -analogue in nature -can be had by children/animals -explains acquisition of concepts (* goldstone) -(Tim crane) content of experience can represent the obtaining of a contradiction
Either: only non-c content, or both c and non-c (Slide)
What is CP? Perception or brain mech.
Model 1 (classic) You have a certain propositional attitude p P involves a concept C (Slide)
Is this compatible with non-c? (2006, Raftopoulos and Müller: 190) - No (2011, Bermudez and Cahen) - ? Content is a function of concepts, so no
Non-c is contingent (?) on there being no concepts in content. (2000, Heck)
Other way to see CP: as a cause, not a constituent
Model 2 (cp lite) Tests with background color for shapes revealed that some subjects would match color to the shape, if characteristically different (orange heart matched to red background) suggesting perception “colored” by concept of “heart” here
- why is this “lite”? (Slides)
Perky effect shows some confusion between imaginative and perceptual experience.
Second example - incorporation of perceptual elements into dreams Third - hallucinations affecting visual experience
- look up “Lilliputian hallucinations”
-shows that states which are themselves influenced by cognitive states interact with the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences
- find some recorded presentation of Fiona's - her accent just needs to be used all the time (best ever - is that Glasgow?)